2.1.1 Quality Assurance (QA) vs. Quality Control (QC) in Defense Acquisition

In the context of weapon systems acquisition, Total Quality Management System (QMS) is a formalized set of policies, processes, and procedures that ensure products or services consistently meet customer (military) and regulatory requirements. Within TQMS, a critical distinction is drawn between Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) (Evans, 2025).

• Quality Assurance (QA): QA focuses on preventing defects and is process-oriented. It encompasses the systematic activities (such as audits, QMS certification like ISO 9001 and AS9100) implemented throughout the entire product lifecycle to build quality into the system. QA is about "how" the product is made and ensuring the contractor's processes are robust from the start.

• Quality Control (QC): QC is focused on detecting defects and is product-oriented. It involves activities (such as inspection, testing, and acceptance procedures) used during the production phase to verify that the final product meets the specified requirements. QC begins as the product is being produced.

• APQP is a proactive, structured methodology originating from the automotive industry, designed to ensure product quality through early planning and stakeholder collaboration. The goal of the APQP is to proactively prevent problems, ensure customer satisfaction, and produce high-quality products by integrating customer requirements throughout the development cycle (Jo et al., 2024; AIAG, 2024).

The challenge in rapid acquisition is shifting the balance: the truncated schedule requires a heavier reliance on proactive QA (upfront risk identification and robust contractor TQMS) to minimize the need for time-consuming, reactive QC (testing and rework) later in the process.

2.1.2 The Role of Quality Audits and Manufacturing Control

Effective defense TQMS mandates rigorous audits to ensure compliance and continuous improvement. Furthermore, a core goal of quality management is to achieve a controlled process, where critical manufacturing processes are repeatable, sustainable, and consistently produce parts within quality standards. This focus on process capability and control is a prerequisite for successful high-rate production and is indispensable even in rapid prototyping to ensure the fielded item is reliable.

2.2.1 MTA Pathways and Flexibility

The MTA is characterized by two distinct pathways, both aiming to field capability within five years:

① Rapid Prototyping: Uses innovative technologies to rapidly develop fieldable prototypes and demonstrate new capabilities, often resulting in a residual operational capability.

② Rapid Fielding: Uses proven technologies to field production quantities of new or upgraded systems, aiming to begin production within six months.

Critically, MTA programs are generally exempted from the traditional requirements (JCIDS) and acquisition (DoDI 5000.01) processes, allowing for a streamlined approach, delegated decision-making, and empowered program managers.

Figure 1

MTA Approach

[Source] https://aaf.dau.edu/aaf/mta/

This legislative and regulatory flexibility is what enables speed, but it simultaneously makes managing technical and quality risk a more active and continuous responsibility of the program manager. The rapid acquisition process for defense capabilities is critical for modern militaries to respond quickly to urgent operational needs and keep pace with fast-evolving technology. While the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea all have mechanisms to accelerate procurement, they differ in their specific structures, authorities, and maturity.

2.3.1 United States (US)

The US Department of Defense (DoD) utilizes several pathways under its Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF), including specific rapid acquisition processes, to bypass the lengthy traditional acquisition lifecycle, which can take years. These pathways are primarily designed to address urgent or emergent warfighter needs and quickly field technologies like software, commercial solutions, and prototypes. Key mechanisms include (https://aaf.dau.edu/):

• Rapid Acquisition Process (RAP): A mechanism to quickly fund the development and fielding of successful competitive experiments and demonstrations, directly supporting immediate warfighter needs outside the typical budget cycle (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Evaluation System, or PPBEES).

• Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA): A streamlined approach for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding of mature technology. The goal is to field a capability within five years.

• Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO): A framework used by the DoD to acquire innovative commercial technologies and services.

2.3.2 United Kingdom (UK)

The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) historically relied heavily on the Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) process, particularly during conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, to provide equipment quickly to forces engaged in operations (https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/40939/documents/199440/default/). More recently, the UK has been focused on broader acquisition reform to build in speed and agility across the defense enterprise.

• Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs): A proven method for rapidly procuring capabilities to meet immediate, unforeseen operational needs, often with a dedicated budget and streamlined procedures. While initially focused on urgent needs, the MOD is continually evolving its standard processes, such as the new Integrated Procurement Model, to integrate lessons learned and ensure pace, flexibility, and iterative development ("spiral development") are central to all acquisition programs.

• Rapid Acquisition Project: Used for specific, urgent procurements like the recent rapid delivery of military support trucks.

2.3.3 South Korea (Republic of Korea - ROK)

South Korea's defense acquisition is managed by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). Traditionally constrained by a slow, rigid system, DAPA and the Ministry of National Defense (MND) are actively working to reform the process to better integrate cutting-edge commercial and civilian technologies.

• Rapid Acquisition Process (RAP) / Rapid Demonstration Programs (RDPs): Introduced to field new technologies quickly, often leveraging private sector R&D and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions.

• New Weapons Acquisition Model (Proposed): A proposed shift towards a bottom-up model allowing defense companies to propose new systems directly to the military earlier in the requirements review phase, aiming to significantly reduce the five-to-ten-year development cycle and accelerate the adoption of technologies like AI and drones.

Table 1

Comparative Table of Rapid Acquisition Processes

2.3.4 Quality Management Implications in MTA

In Korea, the government has introduced rapid requirements in 2023 and improved rapid pilot programs as part of the 2022 national agenda to establish a "new Korean-type force enhancement process.” These initiatives aim to integrate cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and unmanned systems swiftly. The Ministry of National Defense introduced the Rapid Requirements Acquisition System in 2023 to rapidly acquire advanced weapons systems. However, the system only proposes an integrated test and evaluation concept that simultaneously conducts development and operational test and evaluation, failing to provide a basic model for innovation in the rapid requirements development process. This has led to persistent disagreements among stakeholders regarding rapid requirements development (Lee, Jung, 2024). The MTA philosophy demands a shift from risk minimization to active risk management. Leading commercial practices, which the MTA pathway aims to leverage, use a disciplined, gated process that emphasizes manufacturing criteria early in development. Instead of relying on a comprehensive set of reviews typical of traditional acquisition, MTA requires tailored acquisition strategies and tailored quality documentation appropriate to the program's unique risk profile. This tailoring is the theoretical basis for proposing selective quality activities in the ROK system.

2.3.1 Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRL) and Assessments (MRA)

Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) are a quantitative scale (1 to 10) developed by the DoD to measure the maturity and risk of a technology's manufacturing capability. An MRL Assessment (MRA) is the structured evaluation performed using MRL criteria to (Ahn et al., 2025, https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia-article/manufacturing-readiness-assessments):

① Define the current level of manufacturing maturity.

② Identify maturity shortfalls, associated costs, and risks.

③ Provide the basis for manufacturing maturation and risk management.

The MRL framework is divided into nine threads (risk areas), including Quality, Process Capability and Control, and Design. For rapid acquisition, MRLs serve a crucial role as analogous to stage gates for new product development, establishing clear expectations for manufacturing maturity at critical decision points. Commercial best practices dictate that manufacturing processes should be in control before starting production to ensure consistent quality. Therefore, integrating a tailored MRA into the rapid acquisition process is essential for bridging the gap between a successful prototype and reliable mass production.

2.3.2 The Integration of Systems Engineering (SE) Technical Reviews

Systematic technical reviews, guided by Systems Engineering (SE) principles, are the primary mechanism for assessing design maturity and technical risk throughout development. Key reviews such as the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) are crucial for ensuring the design is stable and mature before proceeding to production planning (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20080026352/downloads/20080026352.pdf).

The challenge for rapid acquisition is that the design and manufacturing phases often overlap significantly. To manage this, the technical reviews must explicitly incorporate manufacturing and quality criteria. The Production Readiness Review (PRR), typically conducted prior to starting Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), is the gate that ensures the system design is ready for production and that adequate production planning, including a stable QMS, is in place. For rapid acquisition, this review must be streamlined into Quality Control Gates (QCGs) that selectively verify only the most critical, high-risk items and processes, utilizing the core concepts of SE technical reviews while respecting the compressed schedule.

3.1.1 Research Methodology

The rapid acquisition system operates within a clear legal framework, including the Defense Acquisition Program Act, the Defense Acquisition Program Management Regulations, and the Rapid Pilot Project Management Guidelines, sharing the system's legitimacy and procedural transparency. While essential for transparency, fairness, and responsible use of public resources in defense acquisition, the specifics addressed in these regulations can sometimes conflict with the system's goal of "rapid deployment," creating bottlenecks.

This study employs a mixed-method research design, integrating qualitative comparative analysis with qualitative gap analysis based on the results of domestic expert consultations. The research process proceeded in three main phases, designed to align the theoretical framework established in Chapter 2 with practical implementation challenges within the ROK defense acquisition system.

① Phase I: Benchmarking Foreign Quality Management Cases (Qualitative Comparative Analysis): A comprehensive review of documents and policies governing the quality management of foreign rapid acquisition pathways was conducted, with a primary focus on the U.S. Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA). This analysis sought to identify best practices in tailoring quality activities (QA/QC) and their linkage with engineering reviews (SE/MRA) to maintain quality under accelerated schedules.

② Phase II: Domestic Current Status Survey and Consultation: To understand the ROK context, qualitative data was collected through expert consultations and surveys involving key domestic stakeholders, including the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality (DATQ) and the Rapid Acquisition Center. The consultation focused on identifying operational difficulties, regulatory gaps, and necessary adjustments for applying quality management techniques in the ROK’s Rapid Requirement/Demonstration Programs.

③ Phase III: Gap Analysis and Model Development: A gap analysis was performed, contrasting the streamlined foreign models (Phase I) against the constraints and challenges of the current ROK system (Phase II) and its existing quality regulations. The identified gaps form the empirical basis for the Quality Control Gate (QCG) model proposed in Chapter 4.

3.1.2 Data Analysis

The report investigates the product quality control practices for integrated rapid acquisition projects, focusing on process management, risk factors, and the application of quality assurance protocols in a government-led defense procurement initiative. The study aims to assess the effectiveness of specific quality management frameworks and tools such as QCG (Quality Control Gate), SE (System Engineering), and MRA (Manufacturing Readiness Assessment) within the scope of rapid acquisition.

The study combines quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews. A total of 24 respondents participated, with a majority possessing relevant field experience (over 70%). The survey was conducted with related personnel from major divisions and newly recruited staff involved in rapid acquisition projects. A total of 24 responses were collected: 21 from experienced staff (87.5%) and 3 from new recruits (12.5%). Among respondents, work experience related to rapid acquisition projects was distributed as follows:

Table 3

Work Experience

It was found that responses to the question of whether the overall implementation process of the rapid acquisition program is clear and efficient were divided between “positive” and “negative.” This suggests a gap between the understanding of the program’s objective and the perception of its practical efficiency. In other words, while there is general agreement on the fundamental goals of the system, it is judged that there is a prevailing view that improvements are needed in the detailed procedures and operational methods. This can be summarized in a table as follows.

Table 4

Clarity and efficiency of the implementation process

In response to the question about the most important aspects of the rapid acquisition program, a total of 41 opinions were collected with multiple selections allowed. The aspects most frequently cited as most important were "reflection of requirements," "achievement of testing and evaluation," and "timing of operational deployment (project completion)." This response trend reflects a recognition among respondents that the success of the rapid acquisition program lies not merely in quick execution, but rather in accurately reflecting the user's core requirements (ROC) and timely operational deployment of high-quality products. The table summarizes the frequency of selections for various items:

Table 5

Parts to be reduced in the quality management of the weapon system acquisition process

Considering the characteristics of the rapid acquisition program, a survey was conducted on which aspects of quality management in the development stage most urgently need improvement (multiple responses allowed). According to the survey results, respondents indicated that “omission or simplification of Quality Control Gates (QCG) (29.1%)” is the area requiring the most urgent improvement. The next most frequently cited aspects were “application of simplified Systems Engineering (SE) checklists (21.8%)” and “omission or simplification of Manufacturing Readiness Assessment (MRA) (18.2%).” Opinions consistently pointed to these three areas as needing the most priority for improvement. The table below summarizes the survey responses:

Table 6

Most urgent area for improvement in quality management measures during the development phase

3.2.1 Regulatory and Procedural Incompatibility

The most critical gap lies in the incompatibility of current quality regulations with the nature of rapid acquisition.

• One-Size-Fits-All Approach: Existing domestic quality management regulations are fundamentally built upon the principles of the Traditional Major Capability Acquisition (MCA) pathway, which mandates comprehensive, phased quality assurance activities designed for lengthy, multi-year projects.

• Lack of Specific Methodology: While a 'Rapid Acquisition Business Procedure Guideline' (exists, it primarily outlines the administrative workflow but fails to provide concrete, specialized methodologies on how to maximize speed in quality assurance activities. Specifically, it does not guide quality agencies on which quality activities can be selectively omitted, simplified, or accelerated.

Sequential vs. Concurrent Processes: Traditional regulations necessitate sequential completion of quality activities. Rapid acquisition, however, requires concurrent engineering and overlapping phases (design, manufacturing, testing) (Son, Bae, 2025). The current regulatory structure forces a linear mindset, undermining the speed objective.

3.2.2 The Challenge of Configuration Identification and Quality Scope

A key procedural bottleneck identified is the requirement for the DATQ to perform quality management activities based on a "finalized Configuration Identification Document (CID)" Delayed Scope Definition: In rapid prototyping, the design and configuration are fluid and evolve quickly. Waiting for a "finalized CID" before commencing quality assurance activities significantly delays the start of essential in-process QC and QA, pushing critical quality issues closer to the fielding date and maximizing the risk of expensive, late-stage rework. Scope Misalignment: The current regulatory interpretation tends to push DATQ towards conducting the entire scope of quality activities, which is appropriate for a stable, fully-defined system but is excessive and time-consuming for a rapid prototype or system using proven COTS/MOTS technologies.

3.2.3 Insufficient Manufacturing Readiness Management

The study also highlights a weakness in applying Manufacturing Readiness Assessment (MRA) to rapid acquisition projects. MRA Scope Mismatch: Existing MRA guidelines are often too broad and resource-intensive, designed for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Applying these comprehensive assessments to smaller, rapid projects (especially those using proven or highly-leveraged commercial technologies) results in an unnecessary bureaucratic burden that cancels out the speed advantage.

There is a clear need for a tailored, streamlined MRA framework that focuses only on the specific high-risk manufacturing processes or critical components unique to the rapid acquisition item, thereby maximizing manufacturing predictability without sacrificing.

In summary, the ROK’s rapid acquisition quality management system is currently constrained by an operational reliance on traditional, rigid regulatory frameworks. To overcome these gaps, a new framework must be introduced that legally and procedurally allows for the selective focus on Core Quality Attributes and Critical Items and integrates streamlined quality gates aligned with concurrent development.

4.1.1 Shift to Selective Quality Management

To maximize speed, the model advocates for a clear regulatory shift, as proposed in the source document:

Current Regulation Principle: Quality Management activities by the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality (DATQ) are performed strictly according to the "finalized Configuration Identification Document (CID)".

Proposed Regulation Principle: The DATQ may selectively perform quality management activities on Core Quality Attributes (CQA) and Critical Items to shorten the timeline. The scope and level of quality activity can be adjusted to enable efficient management even before the CID is fully finalized.

This regulatory change legally empowers quality personnel to exercise judgment and focus resources where the technical risk is highest, rather than conducting a full-scope review on every component, which is typically unnecessary for systems using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) or Military Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) components.

4.1.2 QCG Structure and Integration with SE Reviews

The QCGs are defined as mandatory decision points that must be cleared to proceed to the next phase of development or fielding. They serve as simplified, quality-focused versions of the traditional Production Readiness Review (PRR).

Table 7

QCG Structure and Integration with SE Reviews

4.2.1 Focus Areas for Tailored MRA in Rapid Acquisition

For rapid acquisition projects, the tailored MRA should concentrate on the following critical MRL threads, which directly impact the successful transition from prototype to fieldable quantity:

① Process Capability and Control (MRL Thread 6): This is paramount. The assessment must confirm that the critical manufacturing processes—those that are new, complex, or directly affect the CQA—are repeatable and consistently yield conforming parts, even if a formal pilot line environment is not fully established.

② Quality Management (MRL Thread 7): Focus on the contractor's ability to identify and manage nonconforming material (NCM) quickly, and verify that the quality system (e.g., ISO 9001 certification) is adequate for the intended production quantity.

③ Design (MRL Thread 3): Verification of producibility—the relative ease of producing the design economically. This includes an assessment of whether the design is stable enough to start production tooling without high risk of late changes.

④ Materials (MRL Thread 5): Confirmation of the supply chain stability for critical components, especially those with long lead times or single sources, to prevent schedule delays during the fielding phase.

4.2.2 MRA Application Criteria

The level of MRA depth should be determined based on the source of the technology. Proven Technology (Rapid Fielding Pathway): If the system uses COTS or proven MOTS, the MRA should be limited to QMS confirmation and verification of manufacturing processes for the new or custom interfaces/components only.

Innovative/New Technology (Rapid Prototyping Pathway): A more thorough MRA is required, focusing on the manufacturing risk associated with the immature technology itself. The goal is to achieve MRL 6 (demonstrated in a relevant environment) by QCG-2 (CDR) and MRL 8 (pilot line demonstrated) before QCG-3 (Fielding Gate).

5.1.1 Proposed Amendment to Article 13 (Quality Management in the System Development Phase)

The current regulation mandates that the DATQ perform quality management activities strictly based on the "finalized Configuration Identification Document (CID)," which hinders speed. The proposed revision to Article 13(5) provides the necessary flexibility:

Table 8

Proposed Amendment to Article 13

This amendment is the cornerstone of the institutional plan, providing the legal basis for the QCG and Tailored MRA frameworks.

5.1.2 Revision of Subordinate Guidelines

Beyond the main regulation, the subordinate guidelines, such as the "Weapon System R&D Phase Quality Management Guidelines" (must be revised to integrate the new methodology:

• Manufacturing Readiness (MRA) Guidelines: Introduce a dedicated section defining the Tailored MRA Checklist specific to rapid acquisition. This checklist must explicitly filter out unnecessary MRL items, focusing instead on critical manufacturing process control, supplier management for long-lead items, and NCM handling.

• SE Technical Review Manual Linkage: Formally document the link between the SE Technical Review Manual and the proposed Quality Control Gates (QCGs), clarifying the specific quality-related outputs and decision criteria required for each gate (QCG-1, QCG-2, QCG-3).

5.2.1 Adoption of the Core Quality Attribute (CQA) Prioritization System

The ROK acquisition system must formally adopt a methodology that defines and prioritizes Core Quality Attributes (CQAs) early in the rapid acquisition requirements process.

• Prioritization: The Program Manager (PM) and the Quality Agency (DATQ) must collaboratively identify the handful of CQA (e.g., system reliability, specific critical safety features, key performance parameters) that are absolutely non-negotiable for system fielding.

• Focus Resource Allocation: All subsequent Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) activities, including the scope of the Tailored MRA, must be primarily dedicated to verifying and validating these CQAs. This ensures that even with a shortened schedule, mission-critical quality is not compromised.

5.2.2 Enhancement of Contractor Quality Management System (QMS) Requirements

Given the shift toward reliance on the contractor’s processes (proactive QA) over government inspection (reactive QC), the requirements for the contractor’s internal QMS in rapid acquisition contracts must be strengthened.

• Risk-Based Certification: Mandate higher levels of quality certification (e.g., AS9100) or demonstrate superior internal quality metrics for contractors involved in rapid acquisition programs, especially those transitioning quickly to the fielding phase.

• Data Sharing Mandate: Require contractors to provide real-time, transparent access to their manufacturing and quality data (e.g., nonconforming material reports, process capability indices) to the DATQ. This enables the DATQ to perform more efficient remote quality surveillance and proactive risk identification, reducing the need for time-consuming physical inspections.

The implementation of these institutional and regulatory changes, founded on the QCG and Tailored MRA models, is expected to realize the following benefits:

① Simultaneous Management of Speed and Quality: The selective, risk-based approach ensures that acquisition speed is maximized without compromising the reliability of mission-critical systems.

② Increased Efficiency: Eliminates bureaucratic overload by limiting DATQ involvement to only high-risk areas, allowing for efficient utilization of quality expertise and budget.

③ Proactive Risk Management: By moving key quality checks (e.g., Tailored MRA) to earlier decision points (QCG-2/CDR), manufacturing risks are resolved before they cause major cost overruns and delays in the final fielding phase.

④ Institutional Alignment: Updates the formal regulations and guidelines to align the ROK's acquisition policy with its strategic intent to rapidly modernize its defense capabilities, mirroring the successful flexibility of foreign systems like the U.S. MTA.